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For this symposium on Criminal Procedure, I have chosen to examine
the implications of Virginia v. Moore.1 Moore, it turns out, raises difficult
questions about the extent, if any, to which Fourth Amendment rules re-
quire national uniformity or can in fact vary locally. But these questions, it
turns out, also have implications about equal justice in search and seizure
practices based upon race and class.
A. Moore Described
Moore dealt with a seemingly mundane issue. The Portsmouth, Vir-
ginia police, based upon a radio call, had stopped David Lee Moore for
driving with a suspended license.2 A Virginia statute identified this misde-
meanor as a "non-arrestable" offense; the police could arrest for this traffic
violation only under a small number of specified circumstances that were
not present. 3 Nevertheless, these officers did indeed arrest Moore, search-
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1. 128 S. Ct. 1598 (2008).
2. Id. at 1601.
3. Id. at 1601-02. Interestingly, Virginia did permit arrest for driving with a suspended license in
local jurisdictions where "prior general approval has been granted by order of the general district
court." VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-936 (2009). This willingness to allow localities to decrease protections
for individual liberty, but apparently not to increase them, albeit with the apparent involvement of the
local courts, may raise its own fascinating set of constitutional issues. However, the Moore Court cited
this provision solely to point out that the provision was not triggered in the case before it because no
such general order had been issued by the courts in the county in which Moore was arrested. See
Moore, 128 S. Ct. 1602. The provision thus played no part in the Court's subsequent reasoning and was,
indeed, thereafter entirely ignored by the Court. Accordingly, partly because I am here critiquing the
Court's reasoning in Moore, and partly because I do not want to run too far afield of the major concerns
of this essay, 1 see no reason to further address this provision here and leave any complications that it
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ing him incident to that arrest and finding on his person sixteen grams of
crack cocaine and $516 in cash.
4
A Virginia statute prohibited arrest (instead requiring the mere issu-
ance of a summons) on the suspended license charge. 5 That statute did not,
however, provide for a suppression remedy (nor, for that matter, any other
realistically available remedy)6 for its violation. 7 Accordingly, Moore filed
and lost a motion to suppress the evidence pursuant to the Fourth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution, arguing that state law permitted
only a citation, not an arrest; however, Moore insisted that the Fourth
Amendment recognized no exception for search incident to citation. 8 In a
bench trial, Moore was convicted of possessing cocaine with the intent to
distribute, and sentenced to five years imprisonment. 9
The remarkable thing about the case when it reached the United States
Supreme Court is that the Court saw the issue as a simple one when it was
not. All nine Justices agreed with the trial court's denial of Moore's sup-
pression motion, with eight of the Justices signing onto a single opinion
and the ninth, Justice Ginsburg, concurring in the judgment.10 Central to
the Court's reasoning was a concern that allowing state statutory law to
play any role-even as but one factor-in the Fourth Amendment "reason-
ableness" balancing process would create insuperable administrative prob-
lems1 and foolishly permit Fourth Amendment law to "'vary from place to
may raise for another day.
4. Moore, 128 S. Ct. at 1601.
5. Id. at 1602.
6. Numerous commentators have explored elsewhere the minimal value of current civil and
disciplinary remedies for vindicating Fourth Amendment values and deterring Fourth Amendment
violations. See, e.g., Andrew E. Taslitz, The Expressive Fourth Amendment: Rethinking the Good Faith
Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 76 Miss. L.J. 483 (2006) (summarizing and analyzing many of
these commentators' work and seeking to add to it). Even commentators who believe that adequate civil
alternatives to the exclusionary rule can be imagined generally agree that such remedies do not cur-
rently exist. See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999
U. ILL. L. REV. 363 (1999). Only a plurality of the high Court seems to believe that current civil reme-
dies are so effective as to render the exclusionary rule unnecessary. See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 126
S. Ct. 2159 (2006). Addressing the value of civil and disciplinary alternatives in greater detail is beyond
the scope of this article, but, for the purposes of this article, I assume that such alternatives do not yet
provide any serious remedy for Fourth Amendment violations in the vast majority of cases.
7. Moore, 128 S. Ct. at 1602.
8. For a summary of Moore's arguments, see Brief in Opposition, Moore, 128 S. Ct. 1598 (2008)
(No. 06-1082).
9. Moore, 128 S. Ct. at 1602.
10. Id. at 1608-09 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
11. Concerning administrability, the Court considered state law complicated, requiring officers to
make difficult case-specific judgments about whether statutory exceptions to the no-arrest rule applied
in a particular case. Id. at 1607. The Virginia legislature, by enacting the statute, had implicitly con-
cluded that police were fully capable of making these judgments.
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place and from time to time.' 12
B. Fourth Amendment Federalism
But sometimes, contrary to the Court's position, Fourth Amendment
law should vary based on geographic concerns. 13 A local history of particu-
lar police abuses, local political obstacles to constraining the police, local
administrative processes, the distribution of local criminal activities, and a
host of other matters of geography might alter the state/individual balance
that determines what indeed is "reasonable" or not. 14 Geography therefore
frequently matters and, I will argue here, geography mattered in Moore and
can matter even more in future cases in a particular way, for the Court ig-
nored a critical consequence of its decision: its potential to silence the po-
12. Id. at 1607 (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 815 (1996)).
13. See Brief for the Respondent at 46-54, Moore, 128 S. Ct. 1598 (2008) (No. 06-1082).
14. The Court has recognized, in a variety of pre-Moore decisions, that state-level and local
interests do play at least some role, ranging from modest to heavy, in giving the federal Constitution
meaning. See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 13, at 38-53 (summarizing many of these decisions).
For example, as the respondent notes, the constitutional validity of roadblocks, inventory searches, and
other administrative or special governmental needs searches and seizures varies with the details of
various state and local laws, policies, practices, and purposes; the right to search, seize, or arrest upon
probable cause itself turns on probable cause to believe that a particular state, federal, or local criminal
law, which varies widely by geographical location, has been violated; and the size of state versus indi-
vidual interests for the purposes of reasonableness balancing can likewise vary with local conditions.
See id. at 11-23, 45-49, 52.
I find one aspect of the Moore Court's reasoning particularly odd. The Court first concludes
that state laws are irrelevant under the Fourth Amendment because otherwise its meaning would vary
from state to state. Yet the Court next finds that the state's choice to provide no remedy for violation of
its own laws prohibiting arrests for certain offenses is entitled to great weight in the process of Fourth
Amendment interest-balancing. See Moore, 128 S Ct. at 1606 (majority's opinion concluding that the
state's failure to provide a statutory suppression remedy for arrests for minor offenses showed that the
state really did not consider its interest in preventing such arrests to be particularly large); id. at 1609
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (rejecting most of the majority's premises justifying its decision but never-
theless concurring in the result precisely because of the state's statutory silence on a suppression rem-
edy and because of her belief that disciplinary and tort remedies would be available and would be
adequate). Looking at what the Court does as much as what it says, even in Moore, thus suggests that
the Court does sometimes consider, other times not, state and local variations in Fourth Amendment
reasoning. The Court simply fails to tell us expressly what principles, if any, guide the determination of
when local non-uniformity matters and when it does not. At a minimum, the Moore Court has gotten it
backwards from the perspective of a presumption of liberty. Such a presumption would counsel consid-
ering state statutory law under the Fourth Amendment only when it expands individual liberty, not
when it contracts it. The Court seems to approach the problem from precisely the opposite direction.
See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNEt, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY
(2004) (arguing for a presumption of liberty in interpreting any constitutional right); MILTON R.
KONVITZ, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: HISTORY OF A CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE 69-70, 151-52, 158
(2001) (recognizing the Fourth Amendment as a fundamental right and concluding that "rights recog-
nized as fundamental" are "therefore protected by the rule of strict scrutiny"). "Strict scrutiny" requires
both a compelling state interest and use of the "least restrictive alternative" to justify state invasion of
fundamental rights. See id. at 151-52 (in effect creating a hard-to-rebut presumption of liberty for such
rights).
20101
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litical voice of poor urban racial minorities. 15 This potential is not obvious,
and it will be the task of this essay to explain why it is nevertheless likely
to be realized. Here is a short summary, however, of the reasons for my
conclusion: poor urban minorities, the political science literature reveals,
rarely have much political influence on criminal justice policy at the state
and federal levels; they do comparatively better at the local level. 16 Yet the
few state level victories that they do attain can be rendered nullities if the
state is free to seem to award a victory while merely pretending to do so-
that is, to create a right without a remedy, freeing the police to engage in
just the sort of behavior that the rare political coalition that the poor man-
age to cobble together seeks to prevent.' 7 In other words, law enforcement
benefits from state hypocrisy-from laws that say one thing but mean an-
other-thus working to the detriment of less powerful racial minorities
while leaving racial majorities relatively untouched.' 8 If equality values are
15. Cf DAVID FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS: A UNIFIED THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL
FACTS (2008) (critiquing the Court's tendency to create constitutional doctrine presupposing an as-
sumed factual basis that the Court never tests, not even turning to social scientists to see whether they
have, are, or will do so). Of course, the real problem in Moore was not only that the Court relied on
factual claims unsupported by empirical data but that it also failed even to examine certain facts about
the world that were arguably relevant to its decision, namely the plight of the urban poor. This was,
however, not the only factual or legal issue that the Court ignored. Other relevant issues given no
attention, or at best given short shrift, by the Court included these: What role, if any, should a legisla-
ture play in gauging state and individual interests generally, and not merely in the case before the Court,
or should such interest-identification and balancing always be a question for the Court alone? In par-
ticular, what role should state legislatures play, if any, in the reasonableness balancing process under
the Federal Fourth Amendment in other circumstances? What incentives would a rule contrary to that
articulated by the Court create for states to enact meaty search and seizure policies? Attention to these
broader questions would have implications for the narrower ones facing the Court. Moreover, these
broader questions are all important ones related to, but subtly different from, those discussed here, but I
leave these subtle questions for another day.
16. See infra Part Ill.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 79-81.
18. 1 am here addressing the ways in which hypocrisy can have the effect of silencing the urban
poor. Yet why, apart from equality values in the case of race, is hypocrisy more generally a constitu-
tional ill? I plan to discuss this question elsewhere but believe that it merits at least passing attention
here: the injury done to a republican-democratic state that disrespects its entire citizenry by attempting
to look like it is actively solving a politically-salient problem when it is cynically doing no such thing is
inconsistent with sound republican government. See, e.g., DAVID RUNCIMAN, POLITICAL HYPOCRISY:
THE MASK OF POWER FROM HOBBES TO ORWELL AND BEYOND (2008) (making similar, but not identi-
cal, argument); Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Hate Crimes: Symbolic Politics, Expressive Law, or Tool
for Criminal Enforcement?, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1227, 1266-80 (2000) (discussing social benefits and
dangers of purely symbolic legislation promising to right a wrong without a hope of actually doing so).
One definition of "hypocrisy" is portraying one thing as if it is another, creating a kind of false impres-
sion or mask. See RUNCIMAN, supra, at 9-10. Not all lies are acts of hypocrisy, but lies by those with a
(pretended) commitment to uphold meaningful discourse rise to the level of hypocrisy. See id. at 130-
31 (making similar points building on a reading of the work of Jeremy Bentham). Hypocrisy thus
misrepresents an essential aspect of the self or of the institution. See id. Political hypocrisy occurs when
it partially or completely masks political power. See id. at 134. Explains political theorist David Runci-
man, "Bentham believed that one of the tests of the justice of a political act was whether public opinion
would stand for it, because public opinion was expressive of the widest possible set of interests." Id. at
136. But when political hypocrisy masks who is exercising power-when, why, how, and for what
[Vol 85:1
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at all relevant to post-Reconstruction reasoning under the Fourth Amend-
ment, 19 then ignoring this complication, even though it may not be deter-
minative, is hard to justify.
C. Moore and the Geography of the Fourth Amendment
The application of this political complication to the situation in Moore
is straightforward. The legislation at issue in Moore seemed to represent a
victory for rich and poor alike, a judgment that the humiliation of arrest
should be spared any person who is simply charged (not convicted, nor
purposes they are doing so-public opinion is misled and no longer serves as a measure of justice. See
id. at 136. 1 would add that the masks created by political hypocrisy can also contribute to rendering
citizens' opinion imperfectly "public,"-that is, not truly representative of all the individuals, groups,
and interests in the polity while still pretending to be so. One kind of political hypocrisy thus breeds
another. Public opinion, of course, cannot be expressed directly, for the "public" is not a single person
who can speak with one voice. Accordingly, there must be institutions designed to foster the delibera-
tion necessary to create public opinion and to provide mechanisms for expressing and implementing it.
The State provides at least one such institution: the legislature. But political hypocrisy means that an
unrepresentative legislature incapable of divining a truly "public" opinion will craft rules that instead
are exercises of power by selected interests in society. Yet the legislature will righteously proclaim
itself as acting for "the People," using that mantle to justify the State's exercise of its power to use force
to compel obedience to the State's dictates. The criminal justice system involves, apart from the mili-
tary, the most obvious and extreme exercise of the State's power to use force. That system therefore
suffers the most from the ills of political hypocrisy. These observations, it must be emphasized, do not
concern solely the practical point that hypocrisy alters the distribution of power in society in ways that
might not be to some critics liking-that practical point being the subject of the rest of this essay.
Rather, my observations here are meant to make a point about political morality, about what is right or
wrong, just or not, in a democratic republic. Political hypocrisy can render the processes and outcomes
of democratic institutions neither just nor legitimate, indeed not truly, or at least not fully, "democratic,"
at all. If true democracy, roughly defined here as a political system representative of the People, subject
to their will, generally governed by the votes of the majority of individuals composing the People, but
safeguarding the fundamental rights of minorities, is a political good, then hypocrisy is, correspond-
ingly, a political evil.
This summary of the moral case against political hypocrisy, I should caution, oversimplifies
things just a bit. As Runciman again points out, this time relying on the writings of novelist and politi-
cal commentator George Orwell, some sorts of political hypocrisy are more good than bad. See id. at
174-88. Precisely because "the People" cannot speak, yet their authority to do so is what legitimizes a
democratic republican state, we are forced to rely on such fictions as that the legislature speaks the
People's will. But of course it does no such thing. Rather, the legislature consists of persons elected for
the purpose of representing the People's will, but it is the resulting political body that in fact rules. The
legislature thus misrepresents a fundamental aspect of itself as something that it is not, arguably a form
of political hypocrisy. But this fiction restrains the legislature, for if it is to continue to appear to repre-
sent the will of the People, it cannot stray too far from doing its best actually to do so, for otherwise its
hypocrisy will be manifest and cease to serve its function of concealing the real workings of power. A
legislature that thoroughly abandoned even the need to mask the true workings of its power would cease
to feel any constraints, devolving into an open tyranny of the few over the many. Cf id. at 174-88
(articulating a similar argument). True political justice is thus an impossibility, but limiting the danger-
ous forms of hypocrisy that work to exclude some groups from having effective voice in the polity's
operations while tolerating the more benign hypocrisies that restrain individuals wielding power can
lead to a greater approximation of justice than does ignoring hypocrisy's central role in our politics.
19. See generally ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: A HISTORY
OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE, 1789-1868 (2006) (reviewing the history demonstrating the central role of
such equality values).
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even yet tried) with a minor offense. Yet, because the high Court in Moore
provided no remedy when the police choose to violate the statute, the po-
lice are free to do as they choose.
The mere existence of the legislation suggests, however, that state ma-
jorities would bring strong political pressure to bear if they routinely suf-
fered from breaches of the statutory no-arrest mandate. But minorities
would likely find it hard to muster the political power to raise a hue and cry
should these violations fall only on those minorities. Subconscious and
systemic forces thus make it easy for racial bias to kick in, with police
more likely to conduct surveillance in poor urban neighborhoods populated
by racial minorities, more likely stopping members of that group, and, upon
finding a violation, more likely arresting them in contravention of the stat-
ute.20 Moore permits the police thereupon to conduct a search incident to
arrest, increasing the chances of finding contraband (likely, possession of
illegal drugs). But drug legislation itself has been shown to have dramati-
cally disparate racial effects.21 The result of Moore, therefore, is to deprive
racial minorities of the benefits of facially neutral criminal justice legisla-
tion, to undermine police legitimacy among such minorities, to undercut
minority willingness to seek state-level political solutions (and it is at the
state and federal levels where the greatest power for criminal justice to
make a difference resides), and thereby further to silence the voice of the
poor in setting criminal justice policy.
Because my concern is with the potential political impact of Moore's
holding and with the Court's ignoring that impact, there is no need for me
to review the rationale of the various Moore opinions here. Accordingly,
Part II of this essay moves immediately to proving that poor urban racial
minorities have little voice in state and federal-level criminal justice policy-
setting, and examining why that is the case. Part II next explains why these
same minorities do somewhat better at the local level, demonstrating that
the silencing of the poor is not inevitable. Part III thereafter examines the
circumstances under which poor minorities may nevertheless sometimes
attain state-level criminal justice legislative victories. Part III ends with an
analysis of how Moore sets the stage for effectively depriving the poor of
even these rare victories while creating the appearance of doing no such
thing, thus insulating the police from criticism and from pressure to comply
with the legislation's seeming spirit. Part IV, the Conclusion, summarizes
20. See generally Andrew E. Taslitz, Racial Auditors and the Fourth Amendment: Data with the
Power to Inspire Political Action, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 221-98 (2003) [hereinafter Racial Audi-
tors].
21. See, e.g., THE 2009 CRIMINAL JUSTICE TRANSITION COALITION, SMART ON CRIME:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS (2009).
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what has come before, ending with a harsh critique of the Moore rule, or,
more precisely, of the Court's apparent ignorance of the real-world conse-
quences that its cramped constitutional methodology creates.
I. FOURTH AMENDMENT HYPOCRISY
A. Why Poor, Urban, Racial Minority Voices are Not Being Heard at the
Federal and State Levels of Government
Two well-known political scientists have recently argued that federal-
ism, in the sense of a division of power between state and federal govern-
ments, no longer serves a valid social purpose.22 Indeed, they maintain,
many of the supposed virtues of federalism-such as providing government
closer to the people and encouraging policy experimentation-are in fact
better served at the level of the municipality, town, and village. 23 State
government, they maintain, is often distant from ordinary people, more
beholden to the powerful, and rigid and slow in responding to community
needs. 24 I am not sure that these conclusions are always right, but at least in
the area of criminal justice I will argue that they are too often right. More-
over, I maintain, the Court's divorcing of rights from remedies in Moore
threatens to undermine the relatively few instances in which the state does
better than usual in fairly serving the interests of all the people in legislat-
ing about criminal justice.
Understanding why these observations are correct requires an appre-
ciation of just who gains an ear at the various levels of government in
criminal justice policy. Much evidence suggests that entrenched criminal
justice system government employees, well-resourced organized interests,
those likely to benefit most financially from state legislation, and the white
middle class are well-represented at the federal and state levels. 25 Poor
urban racial minorities face terrific challenges in being heard at all, but
their voices are particularly muted before state and federal legislatures. 26 At
the level of the municipality, however, the reverse is true: poor urban racial
minorities have a significantly louder voice in criminal justice affairs, while
the voice of organized interests is sharply reduced.
27
22. MALCOLM M. FEELY & EDWARD RUBIN, FEDERALISM: POLITICAL IDENTITY & TRAGIC
COMPROMISE (2008).
23. See id. at 22-23.
24. See id. at 40-55.
25. See generally LISA L. MILLER, THE PERILS OF FEDERALISM: RACE, POVERTY AND THE
POLITICS OF CRIME CONTROL (2008).
26. Id. at 8.
27. Id. See STUART SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF STREET CRIME: CRIMINAL PROCESS AND
2010]
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1. Who Gets an Ear
One recent study by political scientist Lisa L. Miller clearly shows the
challenges facing racial minorities in the legislative process. Interestingly,
Miller examined group representation at the federal legislature and com-
pared it to that in the Pennsylvania state legislature and in two cities: Phila-
delphia and Pittsburgh.28 Miller discovered that the groups most often
appearing before, and presenting the most witnesses at, federal, Congres-
sional, and Pennsylvania state legislative hearings were criminal justice and
law enforcement institutional agencies: the police, immigration officials,
judges, and Treasury and military officials. 29 Professional associations,
including those of lawyers, doctors, and social service agencies were also
well-represented. 30 Citizens' groups likewise had significant representa-
tion, but these groups were overwhelmingly single-issue groups, such as
Mothers Against Drunk Driving, or Women Organized Against Rape.
31
Broadly-representative, multi-issue citizens' groups, however, were weakly
represented, in Congress constituting but 1.5% of the total number of wit-
nesses, and in the state legislature, only 3% of all witnesses. 32 The single
issue citizens' groups and the criminal justice agencies, moreover, tended
to be repeat legislative players.33 The majority of professional groups re-
peatedly appearing are those who stand to benefit from government lar-
gesse and who have substantial resources to focus on a single-issue, or
CULTURAL OBSESSION 23 (1991) ("[T]he politics of the criminal process at the national level is more
about authority than policy, while the converse is true at the local level."). Scheingold's comment might
suggest a continuum from the federal level (crime control primarily about assertions of authority) to the
state level (less so), to the local level (most policy-oriented, least about the assertion of governmental or
majoritarian power). Whether such a continuum presents an accurate picture of reality or not, Miller's
study pictures state-and-federal-level crime politics as far more alike as mechanisms of social control of
the urban poor than different relative to localities, though Miller herself at times implies the contin-
uum's existence. See MILLER, supra note 25, at 8 ("Thus, on the local level, pragmatism is likely to
factor into crime politics, while moral panics and pressure from vested interests are likely to play into
levels of government that are farther removed from the day-to-day realities of crime and violence.").
28. See MILLER, supra note 25, at 21, 189-99 (describing the research design).
29. See id. at 22-27, 75-84, 95-119; ef generally JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH
CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE
OF FEAR 4-10 (2007) (arguing that recent federal and state legislative and executive branch policies
have resulted in a system of elite "governance through crime" characterized by three features: (1) acting
in the name of crime control or analogous problems legitimates governmental interventions; (2) but the
crime control label masks other political motivations; and (3) the metaphors of crime control insidiously
migrate to subtly alter governance in some more local institutions, such as schools, family, and the
workplace-all with the predictable results of further isolating poor racial minorities, reducing judicial
power as a check on governmental abuses, and undermining the democratic nature of American poli-
tics).
30. See MILLER, supra note 25, at 78-79, 101-03.
31. Id. at 67-69, 96-102.
32. Id. at 67-68, 81-84, 102-03, 117-18.
33. Id. at 77-79, 89, 99-107.
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small-focused-set-of-issues, agenda.34 Civil rights groups get some repre-
sentation, but, apart from the ACLU at the state level, such representation
is erratic and, again, generally single-issue-focused. 35
Government agencies and other institutions, furthermore, do more
than appear at legislative hearings: they lobby overtly, engage in a wide
range of informal personal legislature contact, and have "relatively unfet-
tered access to legislators."' 36 The voices of Prosecutors, corrections offi-
34. Id. at 79, 81, 103, 118-19. That the poor have fewer material resources than the rich is, of
course, true by definition. But philosophy professor Charles Karelis makes a fascinating argument about
how the poor's limited resources can work to limit their social, psychological, economic, and, I would
add, political resources as well. Economists generally embrace the "law of diminishing marginal utility
of consumption," which can be expressed informally as "saying that the less of a good one consumes,
the greater the satisfaction one derives from a little bit of it." CHARLES KARELIS, THE PERSISTENCE OF
POVERTY: WHY THE ECONOMICS OF THE WELL-OFF CAN'T HELP THE POOR 51 (2007). Given that the
poor have little work, money, or education, the rational impoverished person should receive great
satisfaction from these goods, thus being motivated to attain them. See id. at 57. But, explains Karelis,
certain goods, "relievers"-those that "reduce pain, unhappiness, or misery," id. at 67, follow a law of
increasing marginal utility-that is, the satisfaction from consuming the good rises faster at higher
levels of consumption and falls faster at lower levels. See id. at 67-68. For example, if you have six bee
stings, enough pain-killing salve to quiet one sting does you little good, but enough to quiet all six
stings would totally relieve your pain. See id. at 68. A different kind of good, "pleasers" -those "that
cause positive experience, as distinct from removing negative experience," id. at 73, do, however,
generally comply with the more traditional law of diminishing marginal utility. See id. A third group of
goods, "relievers/pleasers," function as relievers at low levels of consumption but pleasers at higher
levels. See id. at 74. "Examples include many basic goods-things that benefit virtually all consumers:
food, shelter, clothing, transportation, leisure, and opportunities to take part in community life." Id.
(emphasis added). At insufficient levels, more of these goods serve merely to relieve pain, while at
above-sufficient levels, they cause positive satisfaction. Id. Thus a poor person living six miles from a
potential job given a transportation voucher reducing his walk to work by but one mile would have the
pain of getting to work reduced but by so small an amount as not to make the voucher worth his while.
See id. at 76-77 (using similar example). But a voucher enabling the poor potential worker to get the
full six miles relieves all her pain while adding the joys, perhaps, of being able to read, talk, or sleep
during the trip and the satisfaction that she will arrive at her destination able to face the working day
without already being exhausted, clear of mind and ready to face a challenge. See id. at 78. At its sim-
plest, this analysis suggests that the resources to travel to legislative hearings at often geographically
distant state and federal capitals or to navigate the formal procedures and politics of these more socially
distant institutions will limit the ability of the poor to participate in politics at higher levels of govern-
ment. But at "sufficient" levels of transportation and political-education resources, the poor are more
likely to push harder for participation at just these levels. Karelis's economic analysis cannot alone
explain the nature and degree of political action by the poor, but it is instructive nonetheless.
35. See MILLER, supra note 25, at 68-69, 97-99, 101, 106-07, 117. Miller notes further, concern-
ing the ACLU, that, while its agenda is broad, its "focus on the rights of the accused, coupled with legal
strategies that must necessarily emphasize specific instances of individual harm, risks further perpetuat-
ing a policy frame that obscures the more diffuse quality-of-life focus of urban citizen groups." Id. at
117. The ACLU "is primarily focused on relatively narrow, individualistic aspects of the criminal
process, for example, the death penalty, surveillance, and policing" that are in some respects "quite far
afield from the concerns voiced" by broad citizens' groups. Id. at 116. Although the ACLU may often
be the only significant voice of the poor concerning crime control at the state and local levels, see id. at
116, and although it has long been a ubiquitous agitator for protecting the legal rights of all, see
SAMUEL WALKER, IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES: A HISTORY OF THE ACLU (2d ed. 1999), it
is precisely its almost-entirely lawyerly, legalistic emphasis that renders it an important but inadequate
influence on criminal justice legislation aimed at the real concerns of the poor.
36. See MILLER, supra note 25, at 73-75, 88-89, 96-97, 103-05.
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cials, probation departments, and crime commissions are loudly heard. 37
Although professional groups as a whole are also fairly active, the efforts
of individual groups tend to be ad hoc, focusing on specialized interests
particularly important to their members.
38
Legislators listen to these organized groups partly because of a belief
in their expertise on complex issues.39 Legislators also tend to look for
fairly simple, specific, concrete solutions to readily-identifiable problems,
and solutions that can be touted to the electorate. 40 Organized groups often
provide just that, appearing with focused draft legislation and reams of
supporting documents and research on narrow questions.41 These groups
have a strong stake in such questions, money from state budgets or mem-
bership dues give these groups the resources to do their political job, and
their repeat player status allows them to cozy up to state legislators and
their staff.42 Furthermore, federal and state legislatures as a whole represent
majorities-meaning middle-class whites-and many legislators cannot
win re-election by catering to minority rather than majority needs. 43 A pub-
lic too busy to investigate the facts and swayed by the fear-mongering of
politicians using anxiety over crime as an electoral tool likewise defers to
the expertise of these organized groups-particularly governmental ones-
and demands that politicians make good on their tough-on-crime prom-
ises.44 There are, therefore, strong political reasons for legislators to heed
the word of groups who urge harsher criminal justice system policies that,
within broad limits, expand the groups' own budget and power. State
criminal justice institutions and single-issue citizens' groups thus tend to
stress ever-harsher punishments and isolated, simplistic solutions to the
complex problem of crime and its control. 45 These observations extend not
37. Id. at 73-76, 79-84, 88-89, 96-99, 116-19.
38. Id. at 89.
39. Id. at 80.
40. Id. at 81, 108-09. For a convincing explanation of why harsh criminal justice legislation
appeals to much of the white electorate, see Joseph E. Kennedy, Monstrous Offenders and the Search
for Solidarity through Modern Punishment, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 829 (2000).
41. See MILLER, supra note 25, at 72-73, 80, 107-12, 117-19.
42. Id. at 73-74, 77-79, 103-04, 118-19.
43. See, e.g., STEVE DOUGHERTY, HOPES AND DREAMS: THE STORY OF BARACK OBAMA (rev. ed.
2008) (noting that, prior to his election to the Presidency, Obama was the only African-American
member of the modem United States Senate); DAVID T. CANON, RACE, REDISTRICTING, AND
REPRESENTATION: THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF BLACK MAJORITY DISTRICTS (1999).
44. See Kennedy, supra note 40, at 869-870; RAY SURETTE, MEDIA, CRIME, AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: IMAGES AND REALITIES 195-238 (2d ed. 1998) (summarizing the complex relationship among
media portrayals of crime, audience perceptions of it, and policymakers' use of it, with a particular
analysis of the role of appeals to fear).
45. See MILLER, supra note 25, at 8 ("National elected officials face a different set of constituent
pressures than local ones because of their geographic and electoral isolation from the problem and, I
suggest, because this isolation allows for the emergence of single-issue groups with narrow interests
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simply to what is criminalized, but also to how police and prosecutors are
allowed to--or encouraged to-do their jobs.
4 6
2. Who Does Not Get an Ear
Broad, informal citizens' groups, like neighborhood associations, lack
the resources and technical expertise that larger groups have.47 They rely
less on data and study than on experience. 48 They are prompted to action
by the pain that both crime and the reigning crime-fighting techniques
bring to their lives.49 They have no lobbyists, little money for travel or
hiring lawyers, and are often skeptical of formal governmental processes.
50
Moreover, their experience teaches them that crime is a multi-faceted prob-
lem that requires multi-faceted solutions.51 Abandoned homes shelter crack
addicts while darkened streets do the same for dealers; poor schooling
leaves too many children without hope of decent employment, thus making
them vulnerable to being lured into crime; unfair and aggressive police
whose problem definitions and issue frames intersect with prosecutors and police around punishing
offenders.").
46. See id. at 61, 73-75, 104-05.
47. Id. at 109-10. One representative of a community organization, the Regional Council of
Neighborhood Organizations, that did make it to a state legislative hearing made the point powerfully
after listening to the State Attorney General plead for greater resources for prosecutors, police, and
prison:
It's hard to be sympathetic to people who come in here, such as the Attorney General's Of-
fice, and I think what they're doing is absolutely fantastic, [so] don't misunderstand me. But
it's hard to be sympathetic to them when they say that they are underfunded. Let me tell you
about need. We're not on a line item of anybody's budget. We give our time free, we search
for a home or a church where we can have a community meeting... we have no staff. We
frequently can't afford a telephone. We don't even have a typewriter sometimes. That's un-
derfunding. And we're told that this has to be a team effort, and I feel like a disabled member
of the team, and I'm not quite sure what I can do if only the generals and the colonels are re-
ceiving the funding and not us, the troops in the trenches.
Id. at 109.
48. See MILLER, supra note 25, at 161-63 (recounting illustrative testimony of community repre-
sentatives at the local level).
49. See id. at 160-63, 170 (citizens groups are less punitive, more focused on harm-reduction,
angry at police abuses, yet desirous of greater police presence, more concerned with prevention, redis-
tribution, physical safety, and crime's root causes). One Pittsburgh councilwoman put it this way:
The community wants the bad guys locked up, they don't want their lives to be in jeopardy
but they also want us to get the root of the drug dealing.... They really want to press the root
issues. A lot of people feel it is a conspiracy to destroy African American communities and
low-income communities. We don't make the drugs, we don't manufacture the drugs. It
seems like there is somebody who is doing this to us. I don't buy into conspiracy theories but
I do see their point. Guns and drugs aren't manufactured in those neighborhoods. The big
boys and roots are in areas you'd never suspect.
Id. at 173 (author's interview of councilwoman).
50. See id. at 83-84, 103.
51. See id. at 174 ("They advocate for more police, but in the context of cleaner neighborhoods,
more opportunities, and better schools, which requires a reallocation of power and resources. As the




tactics produce community distrust that hampers police access to the citi-
zens who can help in solving crimes; and poverty makes for small, crowded
living quarters that drive bored youth onto the street, where trouble awaits
them.52 These problems are shared by the entire community, uniting them
in their fear, and many of the offenders are the children, siblings, friends,
and acquaintances of the law-abiding. 53 These groups, therefore, tend to not
to demand specific policies, but rather affordable housing, accountable and
talented teachers, responsive, fair and caring police, and job programs as
part of the solution to crime and a failing criminal justice system. 54 The
overwhelming nature of these demands discourages legislator attention, for
politicians find it hard to craft solutions that they can even claim to achieve
short-term results from which they can reap political rewards. 55 Moreover,
broad citizens' groups do not come armed with specific proposals, draft
legislation, or expertly-written position papers.56 These oversights can irri-
tate legislators who complain that these broad citizens' groups do not know
what they want and offer little help in the practical task of legislating.
57
Cultural differences complicate matters, as middle-class legislators defer to
busy prosecutors or police chiefs, putting them on early in hearings so that
they may get back to the task of protecting the community. Meanwhile,
citizen representatives often are relegated to speak during the little time
remaining at the end of the hearing-ignoring the speakers' need to catch
buses home, for many cannot afford cars, and to arrive home early enough
to pick children up from school or placate irate employers grudging about
52. See id. at 151-56 (neighborhood quality of life/crime connection), 171 ("[H]ousing, blight,
police-community relations, economic development, education, and services."); see also TASLITZ,
RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, supra note 19, at 78-79.(explaining link between ag-
gressive policing strategies and rising crime, combined with lower capture rates); Andrew E. Taslitz,
The Fourth Amendment in the Twenty-First Century: Technology, Privacy, and Human Emotions, 65 J.
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 167-168 (2002) (explaining connection between the housing quality of the
poor and their greater presence on the streets).
53. See MILLER, supra note 25, at 159-60 ("1 think in the African American community, the
minority community, the Latino community, there're [sic] many parents whose kids are having these
problems and they're not really advocating them being locked up.") (quoting Philadelphia legislator);
id. at 173 ("But at the local level, where the damage of crime is felt in personal, familial, and commu-
nity terms, such a coupling [of victims' needs with harsher punishment] is much more tenuous.").
54. See id. at 107-09; supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
55. See id. at 108 ("Broad citizen groups bring to legislators a set of problems with depth and
breadth that have few simple policy solutions. The convergence of citizen organizations interested in
quality-of-life concerns and a legislative process that seems most amenable to policy-oriented groups
results in a highly restrictive venue for these broader groups.").
56. Id. at 107-08.
57. See id. ("One legislative staffer expressed open hostility towards [such] groups[] 'Those
groups... They don't ever have a solution, they just say 'the cops are going in and making [unfair]
stops."'). When such groups do make specific policy proposals, they tend to involve "out-of-the-box,"
redistributive thinking alien to state legislators' understandings of the problem or law enforcement's
priorities. See id. at 110.
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giving the speakers time off to pursue their "personal business. ' 58 The re-
sult, explains Miller, is that broad citizens' groups "make up a tiny fraction
of the 'interested parties,' a miniscule portion of witnesses at hearings, and
an almost imperceptible percentage of personal contacts with legislators" at
the state and Federal levels. 59 Further magnifying the problem, most of
these broad groups also consist of poor urban minorities in which legisla-
tors from farm country, small towns, and white middle-class neighborhoods
often have little interest.
60
B. Why Poor, Urban, Racial Minority Voices are Heard Locally (but
in a Whisper)
1. Who Gets an Ear Redux
The situation is quite different at the level of municipal government.
Crime can dominate the lives of the poor. The law-abiding are fearful, lose
what money they have to thieves, take insufficient advantage of services
that may be offered at night, face medical expenses they can ill-afford, and
suffer community disruption that makes political organizing difficult. 61
When some of them do get politically active, however, they can elect City
Council representatives who live in the same neighborhoods and are moti-
vated to fight for similar interests. 62 Furthermore, they are geographically
58. See MILLER, supra note 25, at 111-12; cf generally OWEN M. FiSS, A WAY OUT: AMERICA'S
GHETTOS AND THE LEGACY OF RACISM (2003) (arguing that the de facto geographic, economic, and
political isolation of the residents of America's ghettos is so intractable as to require but one solution:
giving residents vouchers enabling them to leave).
59. MILLER, supra note 25, at 103.
60. See id. at 112. One Democratic Pennsylvania Senator bemoaned this emotional and cultural
distance between most state-level legislators and the urban poor:
The more you get away from where it [crime] begins, the more you're talking about [just] a
bad guy that has committed a crime.... What are we going to do? Without knowing or caring
whether he has a family, who's supporting him, what ties he has to the community or she has
to the community. And you don't care how he got there. It's too bad, it's too late.
Id.
61. See Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, When Rights are Wrong: The Paradox of Unwanted
Rights, in URGENT TIMES: POLICING AND RIGHTS IN INNER-CITY COMMUNITIES 13-14 (Tracy L.
Meares and Dan M. Kahan eds., 1999) (making similar point, though overestimating racial minority
political power); J. Cathy Cohen & Michael C. Dawson, Neighborhood Poverty and African American
Politics, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 286-302 (1993) (arguing that traditional types of political activity, such
as voting, giving money to candidates, and volunteering in partisan political organizations are much
diminished in severely impoverished neighborhoods relative to more affluent ones).
62. See MILLER, supra note 25, at 125-26, 135-36. For background on the socio-political histories
of Pittsburgh and Philadelphia, see Peter C. Buffum & Rita Sagi, Philadelphia: Politics of Reform and
Retreat, in CRIME IN CITY POLITICS (Anne Heinz, Herbert Jacob & Robert L. Lineberry eds., 1983);
Matthew Countryman, From Protest to Politics: Community Control and Black Independent Politics in
Philadelphia, 1965-1984, 32 J. URBAN AFFAIRS 813-61 (2006); SOCIAL CAPITAL AND THE CITY: CIVIC
ENGAGEMENT AND PARTICIPATION IN PHILADELPHIA (Richardson Dilworth ed., 2006); BARBARA
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close to City Hall should they wish to pursue formal means of being
heard.63 But they also have at their disposal an array of informal means:
protests, vigils, strikes, ad hoc rallies, and unexpected visits to legislators'
offices. 64 Moreover, crime is so prevalent in the neighborhoods which
spawn these groups that the groups seek broad, long- and short-term solu-
tions, rather than the relatively narrow ones usually offered by more organ-
ized groups. 65 Police are also often seen as part of the problem and bring
with them a history of policing as a symbol of racial oppression.66 The
importance of police-community relations in local crime politics cannot be
overstated. As one political scientist explained:
A... consistent theme is the long history of criminal justice institutions
as tools used by elites for the maintenance of racial inequality, directed
most harshly, though not exclusively, at African Americans. This is par-
ticularly true for relations with local police departments. "Black Ameri-
cans," one African American police officer has noted, "Find that the
most prominent reminder of his [sic] second-class citizenship are the po-
lice .. " Blacks consistently express less confidence than whites in the
criminal justice system, significantly less confidence in the police, more
fear that the police will arrest them unfairly, and substantially less cer-
tainty that the police treat all racial groups fairly. Even when socioeco-
nomic status and encounters with police are held constant-which
FERMAN, CHALLENGING THE GROWTH MACHINE: NEIGHBORHOOD POLITICS IN CHICAGO AND
PITTSBURGH (1990).
63. See MILLER, supra note 25, at 176, 179. Miller elaborates:
While the perils of federalism are potentially a problem in a lot of policy areas, those involv-
ing the poor-a category blacks and Latinos fall into disproportionately-are most likely to
feel its effects. It is one thing to rally your friends and neighbors to the Tuesday city council
meeting or get a dozen people to show up and call themselves Citizens for Less Crime, More
Safety, and a Better Quality of Life. It is quite another to gain tax-exempt status, a lobbyist in
the state capital, specific policy proposals, knowledge about the criminal code, and complex
legislative sessions, not to mention the savvy to frame policy solutions in ways legislators
might respond to.
Id. at 179. A Pennsylvania general assemblyman, who earlier in his career had been a Pittsburgh City
Council member, explained the difference between local grassroots politics and more formal state
politics this way:
I felt more of a lobbying effort at local level than I do at the state level. When grassroots push
happens, they want it done overnight. At the state level, things happen much more slowly...
there is very little will to get what some groups want done actually done. It's too big, too
complex, people feel like they never get a straight answer. Locally [Pittsburgh], there are only
nine members and the mayor. The runaround is shorter, there are few people to point the fin-
ger to. Eventually someone has to fess up to [the] reason why they're blocking what [these
groups] want. Whereas with over two hundred-or, at federal level, over four hundred legis-
lators it's easy to pass the buck. There is a faster return on the grassroots at the local level. It's
harder to pass the buck locally. Legislators are in close proximity to each other.
Id. at 176 (quoting interview with this legislator).
64. Id. at 128-29, 137-38.
65. See id. at 148; Taslitz, supra, note at 20, at 224-248. (summarizing the efforts of poor, racial
minority community members in Cincinnati to achieve longer-term, more comprehensive solutions to
the problem of alleged police abuses in that city).
66. See MILLER, supra note 25, at 124-25, 162-64.
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themselves help account for attitudes toward the criminal justice sys-
tem-race is a significant factor in citizen attitudes toward criminal jus-
tice institutions and actors.
6 7
While there was a time in American history when states and munici-
palities shut poor racial minorities out of politics even more than did the
federal government, the civil rights movement-itself the expansion of an
effective franchise for minority groups-combined with explosive periods
of racial violence to open up local legislatures enough for the poor to take
advantage of the greater ease of access to the local corridors of power.
68
With that access came loud demands for reform of the police, for a more
equal balance between crime control and civil liberties, greater police ac-
countability, and more attention to the underlying causes of crime.69 Local
legislators may be limited in what they can do, but they find it impossible
to ignore entirely the constant local public pressure for action to regulate
the police and to improve the problems of crime and the criminal justice
system. 70 Indeed, local councilmen are often far better-versed about a range
of criminal justice issues than their state and federal counterparts. 71 These
local legislators are also very familiar with the local citizens' groups-
sometimes a dizzying array of them-and their informal actions and pro-
tests.72 One result is that broad citizens' groups also represent large per-
centages of the witnesses testifying at local legislative hearings, meet
regularly with local police officials, and share ideas and information with
them. 73 They engage in more formal action too, including lobbying, while
using threats to go to the media as an effective tool to get councilmen to
67. Id. at 124. See also DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, tables 2.12, 2.13, 2.24, 2.25, available at
www.albany.edu/sourcebook/tost_2.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2009); SAMUEL WALKER, CASSIA SPOHN
& MIRIAM DELEONE, THE COLOR OF JUSTICE: RACE, ETHNICITY, AND CRIME IN AMERICA (4th ed.
2004); Ronald Weitzer & Steven A. Tuch, Racially Biased Policing: Determinants of Citizen Percep-
tions, 83 SOCIAL FORCES 1009-30 (2005).
68. The complex nature of the history of how relatively greater power flowed to poor urban racial
minorities at the local level relative to higher levels of government in many areas is beyond the scope of
this essay but is nicely summarized in MILLER, supra note 25, at 44-48, 79-84, 171-73.
69. See id. at 6, 123-25, 141-42, 162-65; Taslitz, supra note 20 at 224-225. Some of these efforts
are bearing fruit. See DAVID A. HARRIS, GOOD COPs: THE CASE FOR PREVENTATIVE POLICING (2005).
70. See MILLER, supra note 25, at 124-25, 133-38, 144-46. A Pennsylvania House Democratic
representative understood well the local dynamic:
Local officials are living in those communities, they're confronted by community leaders who
can't make it to Harrisburg, saying, "If we did this, clean up this neighborhood..." It's more
real and pragmatic and more visceral at the local level. Those local officials don't leave their
place of work and go off somewhere else. They're here all the time.
Id. at 112.
71. Seeid. at 135-38, 143-46, 149-56.
72. See id. at 128-41, 143-46, 149-56.
73. See id. at 130-38, 146-56, 166.
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come to neighborhood meetings, and to do so with an attentive ear.74
2. Who Rarely Even Shows Up
Perhaps because of the power of these groups, however, and partly be-
cause of the more limited financial resources in most municipalities, crimi-
nal justice agencies tend to shy away from local lawmakers. 75 And, what
little contact they have with local lawmakers tends to focus on administra-
tive issues, like salary increases, improved working conditions, and other
employment issues.76 They may see local government as hostile to their
interests in criminal justice matters, so they seem to focus their energies on
higher levels of government, including efforts to promote legislation to
preempt local reform measures and attempts to craft more comprehensive
solutions.77 None of this is to suggest that city councils are controlled by
urban racial minorities, for local officials have many other groups to whom
they must answer, and many material and political obstacles which they
must navigate.78 But, in terms of criminal justice policy, poor racial minori-
ties tend to have a much greater and more effective voice at the lower lev-
els of government than at the higher ones.79
However, the concentration of urban racial minority voices at the local
level has important limiting consequences. Local government efforts to
improve the criminal justice system are restrained severely by resource and
authority concerns. 80 States have far greater relative resources and power to
effectuate criminal justice policies, especially in addressing the broader
systemic, redistributionist reforms sought by neighborhood reformers. 81
74. Id. at 137-41.
75. See id. at 141-43. Local criminal justice agencies are often so busy simply doing their jobs-
responding to crime and addressing internal organizational issues-that they lack the resources to
devote full-time staff to local lobbying. Id. at 143. Police will, of course, attend City Council hearings
when invited by Councilmen and will on certain issues occasionally initiate Council contact. Id. at 141-
42. But the more common local pattern is "relatively quiescent police advocacy" on criminal justice
policy. Id. at 142. Police apparently see state legislators as both more receptive to law enforcement
positions on such policy issues and more able to garner the resources for action, for it is the state level
at which police aim their limited political resources. See supra text accompanying notes 28-46, 54-60,
75.
76. See MILLER, supra note 25, at 141 ("Most local legislators in this study regarded the police as
highly reactive, lobbying local legislators primarily on issues related to employment conditions.").
77. See supra text accompanying notes 28-46, 54-60, 75.
78. See MILLER, supra note 25, at 144.
79. See id. at 156 ("Such intense citizen pressures can hardly be ignored by local lawmakers.").
Said one Pittsburgh City Council member: "There is more to worry about from grassroots [at the local
level] because they can really hurt you at the polls." Id.
80. See id. at 12 (noting that the most dramatic growth in crime control spending over the last
twenty years has occurred at the state and national, rather than the local, levels).
81. See id. at 60-61 (noting that local groups often raise questions "well beyond the capacity of
the city council to address"), 166 (noting that local groups often make demands that "run afoul" of
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Yet state legislators largely ignore poor minority voices, and, as noted
above, those voices offer very different perspectives from those currently
dominating state politics: these alternative groups seek systemic changes
focused more on prevention, community healing, victim needs, and of-
fender rehabilitation than offender punishment. Recent psychological re-
search helps to explain why state legislators' perspectives differ so
dramatically from those in minority neighborhoods, as I next explain.
C. In a Different Voice: Urban Minorities and Therapeutic Justice
Cognitive psychologist Michael Wenzel and his colleagues, in a recent
literature review, articulated a particularly relevant theory concerning when
individuals prefer punitive, retributive responses to crime, and when they
prefer restorative justice responses to rule-transgressions. 82 Retributive
responses are unilateral, seeking punishment of the offender in proportion
to the harm he has done.83 Such responses are coercive, requiring neither
the offender's agreement to the punishment nor his intellectual or emo-
tional acceptance of its wisdom. 84 Restorative justice responses, by con-
trast, seek to heal the victim, the offender, and the community. 85
Restorative justice processes require the offender's agreement to participate
and to accept certain consequences. 86 Moreover, such processes aim to
make the offender accept that he has done harm, to take responsibility for
it, and to express sincere remorse. 87 Retribution aims at unilateral, external
censure, while restoration ultimately seeks collective choice and offender
self-censure. 88
1. Retributive Responses
Although restitution can repair material harm, rule transgressions also
bureaucratic capabilities, as when they ask for drug houses to be bulldozed, for asset forfeiture funds to
come back to the community, or for local unemployed persons to tear down billboards, and that local
lawmakers operate at the bottom of a multi-tiered political structure that provides them with virtually all
the feedback and almost none of the control).
82. See Michael Wenzel, Tyler G. Okimoto, Norman T. Feather & Michael J. Platow, Retributive
and Restorative Justice, 32 L. & HUM. BEH. 375 (2008).
83. See id. at 378 (emphasizing unilateral nature of retributive justice); Andrew E. Taslitz, The
Inadequacies of Civil Society: Law's Complementary Role in Regulating Harmful Speech, I U. MD. L.
J. OF RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 306, 334-37 (2001) [hereinafter Civil Society] (emphasizing
proportionality requirement of retributive justice).
84. See Wenzel, supra note 82, at 378.
85. Id. at 376, 378.
86. Id. at 378.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 379-80.
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impose symbolic harm. 89 When a transgression is interpreted primarily as
one that insults or humiliates the victim, thus lowering his status and at
least momentarily rendering him powerless, retributive punishment penal-
izes the offender for this symbolic harm.90 The punishment must come
from the community if the sanction is to be seen as recognizing the victim's
true personal worth; the community, in a sense, acts on behalf of the vic-
tim.91 When a robbery occurs, the robber implicitly sends a message to the
victim that, "Your needs for money, safety and security are subordinate to
mine, you and thus your suffering worth less than mine. ' 92 Philosophers
Jeffrie Murphy and Jean Hampton explained the process thus:
One reason we so deeply resent moral injuries done to us is simply that
they hurt us in some tangible or sensible way; it is because such injuries
are also messages-symbolic communications.... Intentional wrongdo-
ing insults us and attempts (sometimes successfully) to degrade us-and
thus it involves a kind of injury that is not merely tangible and sensi-
ble.9
3
If retributive punishment allowed the offender a choice and a voice in
his fate, and also sought his moral improvement and rehabilitation, it would
empower, rather than disempower, the offender, and thus undermine the
goal of bringing the offender down a peg to send the message that he is
worth no more than the victim.
94
2. Restorative Responses
But transgressions viewed less as insulting than as a rejection of socie-
tal values create a collective moral tension: a sense that one member of the
group is challenging the very values that define the group as what it is. 95
Explains psychologist Neil Vidmar, "An offense is a threat to community
consensus about the correctness-that is the moral nature-of the rule and
hence the values that bind social groups together.' '96 Restorative justice,
89. See id.; J.M. Darley & T.S. Pittman, The Psychology of Compensatory and Retributive Justice,
7 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCH. REV. 324 (2003) (justice demands extend beyond restitution); F.
HEIDER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS 267 (1958) ("What is necessary is that the
deeper sources of [the offender's] actions, the sources that impart the full meaning to the harm and that
most typically have reference to the way [the offender] looks upon [the victim], should be changed.").
90. See Wenzel, supra note 82, at 379-80; Taslitz, supra note 83.
91. See Kenworthey Bilz, The Puzzle of Delegated Revenge, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1059 (2007).
92. See Taslitz, supra note 83, at 314-17(offering similar examples).
93. JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 25 (1988).
94. See Wenzel, supra note 82, at 379-81 (choice and voice); Taslitz, supra note 83, at 314-17
(equal worth).
95. See Wenzel, supra note 82, at 380-81.
96. Neil Vidmar, Retribution and Revenge, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN LAW 42
(Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton eds., 2000).
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when successful, reaffirms these definitional group values. 97 Renewal oc-
curs by consensus, a consensus that includes the offender.98 Accordingly,
restorative justice requires the offender's voluntary participation, and aims
to persuade him to accept and reaffirm core community values; this re-
endorsement of those values can occur only if he expresses sincere re-
morse.99 By definition, sincere remorse must be chosen, not coerced. 100
Restorative justice thus aims at achieving a dialogue of mutual respect,
equal voice, with the goal of healing the victim, the offender, and the com-
munity.10l
3. Exile
Of course, the same transgression might be perceived as both implicat-
ing status and community values, but usually one interpretation of the of-
fender's conduct will be primary. 10 2 Where status/power concerns are
primary, for instance, retributive responses will dominate. 103 Yet, such
responses can elicit resistance by the offender-a stiffened spine against
community values.104 Thus, retribution leaves open the question of why
one community member still rejects the community's values, a source of
social discomfort. 105 This discomfort can be resolved by the literal and
symbolic exclusion of the offender from the community.106 As Wenzel puts
it, "[i]f offenders are no longer regarded as members of the community
(symbolically, by withholding from them rights members typically have, or
physically, by locking them away), their dissent no longer causes uncer-
tainty or threat to the value consensus ... although the consensus has then
a reduced range."'107
97. See Wenzel, supra note 82, at 381. ("Indeed, the offender's re-endorsement in the form of
remorse and apology could contribute more to the validation of those values than the preaching of the
righteous who 'knew better all along."').
98. Id. at 381-82.
99. Id. at 381-83.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 381,383-84.
102. Id. at 381-82.
103. Id. at 382.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.; Neil Vidmar, Retributive Justice: Its Social Context, in THE JUSTICE MOTIVE IN
EVERYDAY LIFE 291 (M. Ross & D.T. Miller eds., 2002) (exclusion as "apostates"); J.M. Marquez &
D. Paez, The "Black Sheep Effect ": Social Categorization, Rejection of Ingroup Deviates, and Percep-
tion of Group Variability, 5 EUROPEAN REV. OF SOC. PSYCHOL. 37 (1994).
107. Wenzel, supra note 82, at 382.
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4. Status Competition versus Belonging
But Wenzel's most important insight is that status competition is an
inter-group phenomenon, one in which offender and victim are seen as
distinct, "self and non-self," so that one person's gain is the other's loss.108
Healing, by contrast, assumes similarity: the offender and victim as
wounded parts of a single social body seeking restored health. Indeed,
Wenzel posits that what benefits one part of the body benefits another and
the social organism as a whole. 10 9 Accordingly, when parties lack a com-
mon identity, they are more likely to see rule-transgressions as insults to
status, eliciting a retributive response. 10 When they share a common iden-
tity, they are instead more likely to see such transgressions as challenges to
shared values, eliciting a healing response. 11' Social distance thus promotes
retributive punishment, and social closeness tends to lead to restorative
justice remedies.
Granted, each of us has a sense of belonging to many different groups,
and two distinct groups may nevertheless share a higher-order, more inclu-
sive group.' 12 The degree to which the commonality of the higher-order or
the separateness of the lower-order identification is most salient turns on
the situation.1 13 But two processes can make differences prevail over simi-
larity. First, there can be a "functional antagonism" between two groups,
particularly where the victim's group sees itself as holding values relevant
to the situation that are different from the offender's group.' 14 Second, the
victim's group might view its values as more "representative and normative
of the inclusive group generally."' '5 Consequently, the offender's group
becomes defined as "deviant or subversive." 116 Racial minority status has
repeatedly been shown, at least at the subconscious level, to trigger a
physical fear of those belonging to other races.1 17 The minority race's
108. Id. at 383.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 382-84.
111. Id.
112. See id. at 384; S.L. GAERTNER & J.F. DOVIDIO, REDUCING INTERGROUP BIAS: THE COMMON
INGROUP IDENTITY MODEL (2000); J.C. Turner, A Self-Categorization Theory, in REDISCOVERING THE
SOCIAL GROUP: A SELF-CATEGORIZATION THEORY (A. Hogg, P.J. Oakes, S.D. Reicher & M.S.
Wetherell eds., 1987).
113. Wenzel, supra note 82, at 384.
114. See id. (making similar point); Turner, supra note 112 (first articulating the "functional an-
tagonism" idea).
115. Wenzel, supra note 82, at 385.
116. Id. at 385.
117. See, e.g., Andrew E. Taslitz, Wrongly Accused: Is Race a Factor in Convicting the Innocent?,
4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 121 (2006); Andrew F. Taslitz, Wrongly Accused Redux: How Race Contributes
to Convicting the Innocent: The Informants' Example, 37 Sw. U. L. REV. 1091 (2008) [hereinafter
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members thus come to be linked by the majority to crime.1 18 A spate of
empirical studies demonstrate this phenomenon, from judges meting out
harsher sentences to offenders with "Afro-centric features," 119 to police
using more aggressive interrogation techniques with black suspects than
white ones, 120 to employers evaluating black applicants with minor crimi-
nal records more negatively than identically-situated white applicants.
121
Residential and educational segregation heighten the sense of difference,
minimizing opportunities for members of different groups to get to know
one another well enough as individuals to trigger individualized-
assessments and a sense of group commonality over stereotypical assess-
ments and a sense of group division.1
22
5. Implications
This analysis has significant implications for Fourth Amendment fed-
eralism. Poor urban blacks, for example, are both socially and geographi-
cally distant from middle-class white legislators. 123 This distance,
therefore, encourages a feeling of division between the two groups rather
than of commonality as members of a higher order group: "Americans."'
124
Legislatures are likely, therefore, to respond to rule-transgressions by poor
blacks with retributive anger. But poor urban blacks should instead respond
to rule-transgressions by "their own" with restorative impulses to return the
offender and victim to a newly-healed community. These disparate re-
sponses are precisely what we observe. 125 Yet both groups purport to be
part of the more-inclusive nation. If the minority group therefore perceives
its members who transgress as treated more harshly precisely because their
racial and class membership excludes them from the broader American
community, that breeds minority resentment and protest. 126 Nevertheless,
the minority may seek the majority's aid as part of the latter's obligation to
Wrongly Accused Redux].
118. See Taslitz, Wrongly Accused, supra note 117, at 126-128; Wrongly Accused Redux, supra
note 117, at 1099-1108, 1112-16, 1118-21.
119. Taslitz, Wrongly Accused, supra note 117, at 126-127.
120. See id. at 130-133.
121. See DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS
INCARCERATION 64-72 (2007); Wrongly Accused Redux, supra note 117, at 102-07.
122. See Jeannine Bell, Hate Thy Neighbor: Violent Racial Exclusion and the Persistence of Segre-
gation, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 47 (2007) (residential segregation).
123. See MILLER, supra note 25, at 112, 117-19, 181.
124. Cf Taslitz, Racial Auditors, supra note 20, at 282, 297 (discussing the opposite: how closing
social distance can enhance a sense of commonality with broader groups).
125. See supra text accompanying notes 65-74.
126. See Taslitz, supra note 20, at 244-48 (offering the example of violent protests against racial
profiling in a major city), 288-90 (discussing social benefits of less violent forms of protest).
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aid members of the more inclusive community who are in need. 127 When
these cries for help are either not heard or not heeded, the minority group
may feel insulted as a group and further isolated from the more inclusive
whole. 128 This too seems to be what is happening all too frequently.1
29
D. Occasional State-Level Faux Minority Victories and Their
Consequences
However, it is also not true that poor urban racial minorities never
prevail at the state level. They do sometimes succeed in being heard,' 30 and
logic suggests that this should most often be true in two situations:
(1) where majority and minority interests coincide; 31 and (2) where horri-
ble, extreme abuses or repeated ones, especially those occurring in multiple
communities-unjustified beatings or killings of citizens by police being
prime examples-gain so much media attention or prompt such dangerous
protests, such as riots, that the problem becomes impossible to ignore if the
state is to show even a minimal commitment to equal justice and the pro-
tection of its citizenry. 132 Indeed, it is likely that at least one of these cir-
cumstances explains the Virginia statute in Moore: either too many middle-
class whites were complaining of arrests for minor traffic violations, or too
many arrests of racial minority group members for minor violations ended
in violence or other high-profile abuse. 133
But this is precisely the danger that the Moore rule creates: if the state
can adopt a statute that seems to protect a criminal procedural right, such as
protecting individuals, communities, and the people from the invasions of
privacy, property, and liberty involved in arrests for minor traffic offenses,
while in fact providing no remedy to make those victimized whole or to
127. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Judging Jena 's D.A.: The Prosecutor and Racial Esteem, 44 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 393, 395-96 (2009).
128. See id. at 414; Taslitz, supra note 20, at 266-69; Taslitz, Civil Society, supra note 83, at 373-
76.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 47-60, 67-68.
130. See MILLER, supra note 25, at 108-09 (offering examples of success at being heard).
131. Cf Richard Delgado, Explaining the Rise and Fall of African-American Fortunes: Interest-
Convergence and Civil Rights Gains, 37 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 369, 370-71 (2002) (arguing that
racial minorities most often make civil rights gains when the white majority's self-interest converges
with that of the minorities').
132. See, e.g., Taslitz, Racial Auditors, supra note 20, at 244-48 (discussing political gains made
by racial minorities concerning police reform after race riots in protest against police abuses, albeit
gains made at the local level).
133. It is hard to know from the legislative record whether this is in fact an accurate description of
how the statute came to be passed because the record is sparse and ambiguous. But whether racial or
class coalitions in fact had anything to do with the statute's adoption is less important than the reality
that the Moore decision changes political calculations for minorities concerning criminal justice matters
for a wide range of future issues.
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give police serious incentives to comply with the law, then no real right
exists. Yet the existence of the faux right can placate the very political
forces that on rare occasions allow poor racial minorities to affect state-
level criminal justice policy. Even worse, however, such symbolic, band-
aid solutions can, as ample research shows, give police discretion that
may-even if because of subconscious motivations-be used dispropor-
tionately and aggressively against racial minorities. Thus police might re-
frain from arresting whites for minor traffic offenses but feel less
constrained from making similar arrests of blacks. Whether this was true in
Moore itself, and whether either of the two situations maximizing minority
voices were actually present in Virginia, does not, however, alter the con-
clusion that the Moore rule unacceptably raises the risk of such unequal
treatment in future cases, and of silencing the political voices all too rarely
heard at the state level. Stephen J. Fortunato, Jr., a former Associate Justice
on the Rhode Island Superior Court, made this very point forcefully,
shortly after the Moore opinion was rendered:
What is not mentioned in the Supreme Court opinion-but what can be
ascertained in lower court decisions, including that of the Virginia Su-
preme Court when it reversed Moore's conviction-was that the
"Chubs" mentioned in the original radio transmission [reporting some-
one driving on a suspended license] was not Moore but rather a man
named Christopher Delbridge. Also, one of the police officers explained
at the suppression hearing that they had ignored Virginia law relative to
the issuance of citations in such circumstances because it was "just our
prerogative; we chose to effect an arrest."
But the most important fact in this case-one which was ignored by
the Virginia courts, the Supreme Court, and the few media accounts of this
case-is that David Lee Moore is African-American.
Justice Scalia and his equally myopic and complacent colleagues re-
fuse to address the problem of racial profiling-or "driving while black"-
that has been widely discussed in law and political science journals, as well
as reported anecdotally by black males-both ordinary citizens and those
who enjoy professional or political prominence. 1
34
Fortunato saw the Moore decision as completing a process begun in
Whren v. United States,135 where the Supreme Court held that the subjec-
tive racial bias of officers in conducting a search and seizure was irrelevant
to its reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment:
Around the country, scholars, lawyers, community activists and even
many progressive law enforcement officers are trying to eliminate the
134. Stephen J. Fortunato, Jr., Supreme Court OKs Racial Profiling, IN THESE TIMES,
www.inthesetimes.com/article/3685/supreme-court-oks-racial_profiling (May 19, 2008).
135. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
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scourge of racial profiling. But read together, the Moore and Whren rul-
ings demonstrate the Supreme Court's impatience with municipal and
state efforts designed to circumscribe arbitrary police behavior often mo-
tivated by racial stereotyping. 136
One response to this criticism of the Moore rule is that a contrary rule
would simply lead states to abandon even symbolic action, or at least the
possibility of administrative sanctions on wayward officers. But if I am
right that these sorts of state statutes pass only in circumstances of unusual
political heat and urgency, then "do nothing" will not be a viable political
alternative to suppression. The legislature will pass the statute and accept
the cost of the suppression remedy: giving poor minorities appropriate
remedies for the injuries to their constitutional rights, and prompting police
administrators to do what they can to comply with those rights.
III. POTENTIAL FLAWS IN THE HARD VERSION OF THE THEORY
A. The Objection that Urban Minorities Can Protect Themselves
Critics might raise this objection to the theory I articulate here: If poor
racial minorities have adequate political power at the local level, as they
especially should in cities where racial minorities in fact constitute that
city's majority, should not the local political system provide adequate pro-
tection against police abuses? Assuming arguendo that this criticism is
valid, the scope of my critique would be limited, but its logic would not be
so constrained.
For example, state troopers often have jurisdiction over traffic viola-
tions on the interstate highway system. 137 Because the state enabling laws
pre-empt local ordinances in such a situation, a state law creating a right
without an effective remedy would still leave police free to abuse their
discretion-that is, to arrest someone purportedly for a minor traffic viola-
tion for which arrest is barred under state law, and then to conduct a
"search incident to arrest." If the search produced contraband, drug charges
would be filed; if no contraband is found, the arrestee would be released. 138
Similarly, a minority resident of a city with a protective ordinance who
travels in a city in his home state that lacks such an ordinance would not be
protected from arrest for a traffic violation in the latter location. Yet, such
travelers are not community members in the areas where they travel, and
thus lack political power to correct the abuses they endure. Indeed, that
136. Fortunato, supra note 134, at 2.
137. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 53:1-11.1 (West 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-188 (West 2009).
138. Virginia v. Moore, 128 S. Ct. 1598, 1602 (2008) (providing an example of a search incident to
arrest).
[Vol 85:1
THE SILENCING OF THE AMERICAN POOR
reality creates an incentive for police in the city lacking a protective statute
to focus unjustified arrests on sojourners rather than city residents. Thus,
the result from leaving matters entirely to the local political systems is, for
example, that racial minorities (who may already face an increased risk of
traffic stops relative to whites) traveling in cities lacking protective ordi-
nances may face unequal protection of the laws while traveling. This ine-
quality burden imposed on minority travelers is not lessened by any
significant political power they hold in their home towns. If equal protec-
tion is a value that should inform Fourth Amendment reasonableness, this
is indeed a troubling result. A statewide problem can only be cured by a
statewide fix.
Of course, there may be similar problems if residents of a state with a
protective ordinance cross into a state without one. One way to avoid the
problem altogether would be for the United States Supreme Court to hold
that arrests for minor traffic offenses punishable only by a fine are never
reasonable anywhere in the nation under the Fourth Amendment, because
the state's interest in detention is small while the invasion of the individ-
ual's privacy and liberty interests is substantially larger. But this is a path
that the Court firmly refused to take in Atwater v. Lago Vista. 139 It partly
refused to do so because it was not convinced that such arrests were a sig-
nificant nationwide problem. 1
40
But what if such arrests are shown to be a significant problem within a
particular state, and that state's people, through its legislature, recognize
the problem by passing a statute prohibiting arrests for such offenses? Once
the state recognizes the problem-that the state's interest in arrest is too
small to justify it given the harm that it does-it also necessarily recognizes
that these arrests are unreasonable. Arguably, the Court should give great
deference to such a state legislative judgment. 14 1 The Court should not,
however, give the same deference to the legislature's judgment to provide
no statutory remedy for violation of the state's no-arrest statute precisely
because of the dangers outlined here: abuse based upon race and class.
Even a locally powerful racial minority will be far less able to correct such
statutory flaws at the state level precisely because that is a governmental
level at which such a minority has little voice.
14 2
139. 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
140. Id. at 353.
141. Cf U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2 (specifying that enforcement powers specifically belong to
Congress).
142. See MILLER, supra note 25, at 8.
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B. The Objection that the Fourth Amendment Will Vary from "Place to
Place"
1. Fourth Amendment Precedent and Policy
But this approach seems counterintuitive for another reason: it creates
a "local" Fourth Amendment, one which varies from place to place. As I
explained in an earlier footnote, the Court's doctrine often permits a wide
variety of local variations in Fourth Amendment outcomes. 143 Moreover,
the Court has defined reasonableness as a balancing of state against indi-
vidual interests, 144 and it seems logical that those interests can vary geo-
graphically. Of course, there are administrative costs associated with
having local variations in rules, and those can be reasons to prohibit such
variations in some instances. 145 But Moore and his amici offered compel-
ling explanations for why such administrative costs are usually small. 146
Leading Fourth Amendment scholar Tracey Maclin has made similar
points powerfully in a fictional dissenting opinion (written by him as a
pretend member of the United States Supreme Court) to the Court's deci-
sion in Whren,147 a case often understood as holding that subjective racial
pretext by officers making a traffic stop is unconstitutional under the
Fourth Amendment. 148 The defendants in Whren had argued not for a truly
subjective test but rather that, if police materially deviated from the usual
standards or practices of the local police department so that a reasonable
officer under those circumstances would not have made the stop for the
reasons given, the stop would be considered unreasonable. 149 The Court
rejected this proposed test, partly because of concerns, similar to those in
Moore, regarding local variations in police practices, and partly because of
a fear that the test was in fact a cover for a subjectivity alien to the objec-
tive reasonableness inquiry required by the Fourth Amendment's text. 150
143. See supra note 14.
144. U.S. v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983).
145. Virginia v. Moore, 128 S. Ct.1598, 1607 (2008).
146. See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 13, at 50-54.
147. See 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
148. See Tracey Maclin, United States v. Whren: The Fourth Amendment Problem with Pretextual
Traffic Stops, in WE DISSENT: EIGHT CASES THAT SUBVERTED CIVIL LIBERTIES AND CIVIL RIGHTS:
TALKING BACK TO THE REHNQUIST COURT 90 (Michael Avery ed., 2009).
149. See id. at 97.
150. See Whren, 517 U.S. 815.
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The first argument, however, says Maclin, "is not a serious objec-
tion."' 5 1 This is so, he explains, because current Fourth Amendment doc-
trine already permits considerable variation based upon local police
practices. Thus, the result in a Fourth Amendment case frequently "de-
pends upon whether police are following departmental rules or standard-
ized procedures."' 52 Likewise, "[i]n other contexts, seizures that are exactly
similar in scope and operational procedures are distinguished on constitu-
tional grounds depending upon the intent of the police," while in "still other
cases, the legality of the search or stop sometimes turns on the presence or
absence of minute factual detail."' 153 Explains Maclin,
For example, an inventory search of a car conducted in Alabama
pursuant to standardized policy is permissible under the Fourth
Amendment, while the same inventory search conducted in
Arizona in the absence of standardized policy is impermissible.
Similarly, under our precedents, a roadblock that seizes vehicles is
permissible if established with the intent to detect drunk driving or
to check the license and registration documents of the
motorist.... Thus, the Court proffers an exaggerated and
unconvincing objection when it states that the seizure in this case
would be permissible in a jurisdiction that did not have a
departmental policy against plain-clothes officers making traffic
stops.... The law books are full of Fourth Amendment rulings
that turn on fact-bound distinctions. The important point here is
that Officer Soto's actions deviated from the usual practice in the
District of Columbia. What an officer would have done in New
Jersey or Alaska is irrelevant in determining whether this stop was
arbitrary. 154
Concerning the Court's second argument-that the defendant's pro-
posed test was a cover for a purely subjective approach to constitutional-
ity-Maclin raised a related argument. Maclin contends that it is true that
the point of the proposed test is to discourage racial profiling; however, the
proposed test itself is entirely objective: what were the usual standards and
practices of the local department, and did these officers in this case sub-
stantially deviate from them? 155 The defendant's test also assumes that
there are, or, rather, must be, clearly identifiable departmental standards.
But that, argues Maclin, is all to the good because such arbitrary searches
and seizures are at the core of the definition of police conduct as "unrea-
sonable."156
151. Macin, supra note 148, at 110.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 10-11.
155. Seeid. atIlO.
156. See id. at 109.
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Maclin was, of course, writing about truly local variations in depart-
mental policies. But if geographic variations at the municipal level can
sometimes be consistent with the dictates of the Fourth Amendment, I can-
not see why state-level variations would not also be sometimes permissible.
There are only fifty states but thousands of municipalities and smaller
communities. Concerns about variation are thus much smaller when work-
ing with the state as a unit than the locality. Maclin's logic should still con-
trol.
2. Broader Considerations of Constitutional Law and Policy
Moreover, as Professor Mark D. Rosen aptly explains, the Court has
often allowed geographic variations in constitutional rules involving par-
ticular communities. 157 Military bases, Native American reservations, and
public schools are all local communities in which the precise scope of the
controlling constitutional test varies in such diverse areas as free speech,
due process, and search and seizure. 158 Some constitutional tests indeed
expressly embrace local variation, so much so that, according to Rosen,
"geographical nonuniformity of constitutional requirements ... is a main-
stay of American constitutionalism." 159 Perhaps the most obvious example
of a test expressly embracing local variation is the test for whether speech
is obscene, and thus unprotected under the First Amendment. Material is
obscene if, taken as a whole, (1) it appeals to the prurient interest, (2) de-
picts or describes sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and (3) lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. 160 The first two prongs
turn on each juror's assessment "of the average person in the community or
vicinage from which he comes." 161 In crafting this test, the Court expressly
rejected a uniform national rule:
It is neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to read the First Amend-
ment as requiring that the people of Maine or Mississippi accept public
depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas, or New York City.
People in different States vary in their tastes and attitudes, and this diver-
sity is not to be strangled by the absolutism of imposed uniformity. 162
Rosen does not argue that local variations should be the rule. Rather,
157. See generally Mark D. Rosen, Our Non-uniform Constitution: Geographical Variations of
Constitutional Requirements in the Aid of Community, 77 TEX. L. REv. 1129 (1999).
158. See id. at 1134, 1138-41, 1149-61. Rosen concedes that the tribal court opinions are "quasi-
constitutional" in nature, but that is a distinction without a difference for their logic and illustrative role
is thereby unaltered. Id.
159. Id. at 1133.
160. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
161. Hamling v. U.S., 418 U.S. 87, 104 (1974).
162. Miller, 413 U.S. at 32-33.
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he argues that a normative question must be posed whether the national
community's interests are best served by some measure of local variation,
and, next, whether such variation is fairly administrable. 163 He complains
that, though courts permit such variation, they consider the option too
rarely and confine it unwisely to narrow contexts.
164
He offers guidance for answering these questions by exploring three
techniques that courts use to localize rules. These techniques turn on under-
standing the difference between "rules" and "standards." Rules articulate
concrete factual circumstances that activate them or that are "otherwise
determinate in the community."' 165 Standards rely on abstractions contain-
ing the underlying goal animating the law. 166 Constitutional doctrine,
Rosen argues, develops in three stages: first, the courts translate the consti-
tutional text into the goals it is meant to serve; second, they translate the
goal into a legal test, usually in the form of a standard, though there might
be rule-like components; and third, they derive true rules that stem from the
standard. 167
Courts correspondingly achieve non-uniformity explains Rosen, in
three primary ways. The first way, "tailoring," applies the existing standard
but with an eye toward the unique circumstances and needs of local com-
munities. 168 The second way, "re-standardizing," crafts an entirely new
standard for a specific community or set of communities. 169 The third way,
"re-targeting," alters the goal of the constitutional provision in a way that
embraces occasional local variation.1 70 Rosen further argues that the case
to be made for local variation is strongest where it is necessary to create or
preserve norms that sustain the community and where the general society
has a particular interest in that community's continued existence.
1 71
"Tailoring" aptly describes Maclin's suggested approach: namely, that
local community needs lead (or should lead) to varying local police prac-
tices that are relevant to whether a particular police action departing from
those practices is "unreasonable" under the Fourth Amendment. 172 Rosen
163. See Rosen, supra note 157, at 1134.
164. Seeid. at 1134-35.
165. See id. at 1142.
166. See id. For a particularly enlightening analysis of standards versus rules, see FREDERICK
SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-
MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 104 n.35 (1991).
167. See Rosen, supra note 157, at 1142-43.
168. Id. at 1144.
169. Id. at 1144-45.
170. Id. at 1145-46.
171. See id. at 1149-50.
172. Id. at 1144.
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himself offers a number of Fourth Amendment or Due Process search-and-
seizure-related examples. One example that earned his approval involved a
tribal court's redefining "probable cause" to take into account the "custom-
ary and traditional ways of the Hopi people." 173 Rosen was far more criti-
cal, however, of two more well-known search and seizure cases. In Pratt v.
Chicago Housing Authority,174 a court struck down a Chicago Housing
Authority policy to conduct "sweep" searches without probable cause in a
housing project that had suffered from intense violent crime, and where the
vast majority of the residents enthusiastically supported the policy. Rosen
argued that the overwhelming support of the residents indicated that there
was no local reasonable expectation of privacy under the extreme condi-
tions of violence, so the Fourth Amendment should not have barred the
searches. 175 Rosen recognized that this might have meant that a majority
within a local minority community would rule. 176 But, he maintains, the
Court already recognizes that Fourth Amendment privacy expectations
must be "reasonable," that is, must reflect community rather than idiosyn-
cratic expectations. 177 Furthermore, majority views are only a component
of any constitutional analysis and could be rejected if strong normative
considerations counseled otherwise. 1
78
Rosen's second search and seizure example to which he took umbrage
involved gang ordinances and anti-gang injunctions: for example, prohibi-
tions on gang members "loitering" in certain neighborhoods. 179 Illinois
courts struck down such an ordinance on void-for-vagueness grounds,
180
but California courts upheld an analogously-phrased anti-gang injunc-
tion. 181 The Illinois courts, Rosen complained, worried about harassment of
the innocent, including of joggers, those hailing taxis, and those stopping to
get out of the rain. 182 But to Rosen the relevant question was very different:
whether the language was "sufficiently definite to persons living in a city
thick with street gangs."'183 Rosen preferred the reasoning of the California
173. Hopi Tribe v. Kahe, 21 I.L.R. 6079 (Hopi Tr. Ct. 1994).
174. 848 F. Supp. 792 (N.D. 111. 1994).
175. Rosen, supra note 157, at 1167-68.
176. Id. at 1168.
177. Id. at 1169.
178. See id.
179. Id. at 1173-76.
180. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 533 (Il. 1997), cert granted 523 U.S. 1071
(1998). The United States Supreme Court did ultimately strike down the Morales ordinance as void-for-
vagueness, but its reasoning was not relevant to the local variation question. Chicago v. Morales, 527
U.S. 41 (1999).
181. See People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P. 2d 596 (Cal.), cert. denied 521 U.S. 1121 (1997).
182. Rosen, supra note 157, at 1174.
183. Id.
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Court, which began its opinion by emphasizing that "[a] contextual applica-
tion of otherwise unqualified legal language may supply the clue to a law's
meaning, giving facially standardless language a constitutionally sufficient
concreteness." 184 Concluded the Court, prohibitions against "confronting,"
"'annoying," or "harassing" were not constitutionally vague when read in
the context of the local needs. 185 That context involved numerous instances
of gangs threatening or actually physically harming residents. In this con-
text, concluded the court, there is "little doubt as to what kind of conduct
the decree seeks to enjoin."'
186
It does not matter whether I agree with Rosen's positions concerning
these specific examples. The point is that, where plausible, an inquiry con-
cerning the wisdom of local tailoring should be made. Ultimately, norma-
tive considerations will determine the outcome of any particular inquiry,
but courts should not be close-minded to making it. Furthermore, the more
extreme technique of re-standardizing can be wise, as Rosen explains,
where those with expert knowledge of local idiosyncracies make the case
that a different standard should govern.187 Finally, he argues that re-
targeting, at least in the form of adding to the goals of the constitutional
provision, often makes particular sense if the added goals include enhanc-
ing rights to participate in governance, or to train citizens for the character
of political expression needed in a sound government. 188 These factors
matter because political participation goes to the heart of the American idea
of what it means to live in a republic.1
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My argument here is that the situation in Moore presented exactly the
last circumstance: a need for local variation that would enhance citizens'
political participation, and would help train them in the character of skepti-
cism about governmental use of force that helps citizens to be effective
watchdogs against abuses. 190 To the extent that Fourth Amendment doc-
trine does not expressly embrace these citizen-participation and citizen-
training goals, they should be added. I am not, however, necessarily argu-
ing for re-standardizing because I believe the current standard, properly
184. Gallo, 929 P.2d at 612.
185. Id. at 612-13.
186. Id. at 613.
187. See Rosen, supra note 157, at 1176-78.
188. Id. at 1145-46, 1159-60; see also Downey v. Bigman, 22 I.L.R. 6145 (Navajo 1995) (refor-
mulating Sixth Amendment jury trial right as embracing the goal of participatory democracy).
189. See generally TASLITZ, supra note 19, at 276 (arguing for an approach to privacy that is not
based on judicial tyranny).
190. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Slaves No More! The Implications of the Informed Citizen Ideal for
Discovery Before Fourth Amendment Suppression Hearings, 15 GA. ST. L. REV. 709 (1999) (discussing
the nature of the modem "monitorial citizen").
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applied, can readily be tailored to meet community needs. The Fourth
Amendment's text prohibits "unreasonable" searches and seizures. 191 The
Court has largely defined that text, at least where history provides no clear,
determinate answer (and I believe that it rarely does) as meaning that rea-
sonable actions are those where governmental need outweighs infringe-
ments on privacy, property, and locomotion. 192 My argument is simply that
there is good reason to believe that the state's interest in having no reme-
dies when police violate local arrest statutes adopted by a state-effectively
conceding their necessity under local conditions-does not outweigh the
resulting harm to individuals and communities. If, however, a court were to
insist that the impact on communities, rather than only individuals, is ir-
relevant, then I would re-standardize to take such community harms into
account. 193
C. The Objection that Minorities Would Not Want Protection
I concede that in the space I have here I have not offered anything like
a full defense of either of my last two points: that state legislative judg-
ments of unreasonableness merit judicial deference, and that a "local"
Fourth Amendment at least sometimes makes sense, having noted above
that I leave such more complete defenses for another day. My argument
thus does depend on certain assumptions that I find convincing but that
others might not.
Yet, is it a valid assumption that in cities where minorities are in the
majority, or where they are at least a sizeable portion of the local popula-
tion, that the minorities will have enough political power to protect them-
selves in the area of criminal justice? (Remember that I have thus far
accepted that assumption in this section, though solely for the sake of ar-
gument). My argument here has been only that minorities generally do
better politically in the area of criminal justice at the local level than they
do at the state level. But I have not argued that poor, urban racial minorities
either control local legislative outcomes or even have an equal voice
there. 194 Indeed, the empirical data cited here supports quite the opposite
conclusion: that minorities' local victories are often (though not always)
modest or ephemeral, albeit still far more significant than at the higher
191. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
192. See ANDREW E. TASLITZ, MARGARET L. PARIS, & LENESE C. HERBERT, CONSTITUTIONAL
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (3d ed. 2007).
193. See TASLITZ, supra note 19, at 259-60 (summarizing the argument that group voices and
group harms are relevant to determining Fourth Amendment reasonableness).
194. See supra text and accompanying notes 22-34.
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levels of government. 195
Still, says the critic, my argument nevertheless suggests that local leg-
islatures should do better than state or federal ones in controlling police
abuses like those in Moore. But there is little, if any, evidence of local leg-
islatures passing better remedial legislation concerning arrests for minor
offenses than do the states. 196 One critic reading an earlier draft of this
article argued that there was a good reason for this: poor urban racial mi-
norities are more concerned about their own safety-about police under-
enforcement than about police abuses or over-enforcement. Granted, said
this critic, minorities, like majorities, prefer having both safety and respect,
but, if forced to choose, minorities prefer safety every time, and they prefer
it so strongly that, if they get it, they are not going to complain. Where they
will complain is when they get neither safety nor fairness.
197
But that last scenario, I think, is not likely to be a rare circumstance.
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Moreover, if minorities get neither safety nor fairness, that would seem to
be an indication that they in fact lack sufficient local political power in the
195. See MILLER, supra note 25, at 145-46, 165, 177. Explains Miller, "[t]he findings outlined here
are not suggestive of a halcyon local political environment where there is widespread agreement on
quality-of-life concerns or an environment for crime policy debates in Philadelphia and Pittsburgh that
lacks the NIMBYism and other parochialisms that have been so well documented in local contexts."
See id. at 145-46. "On the contrary," she continues, "citizen groups are often quarreling with legisla-
tors, the police, government agencies, and, often, each other." Id. at 146. Moreover, research in other
areas widely recognizes that poverty limits political participation, though Miller notes black political
participation is more likely to increase somewhat where there are more black elected political represen-
tatives, something perhaps more likely to be true at the local than the state levels of government. Id. at
165. Yet even where citizens' groups do get active locally, "they operate in a highly constrained envi-
ronment, struggling to keep active under extreme conditions, including stress from losing loved ones to
violence, fear of violence, and limited resources." Id. Furthermore, neighborhood representatives tend
to stress the needs of their specific neighborhood, which may differ from those of other neighborhoods,
undermining broader local coalitions, while further class and race subdivisions within local minority
communities exacerbate internal tensions. Id. at 166. On the severe limits on minority political success
even at the local level, Miller finally notes:
[Liocal crime politics is a mess of self-interested, frustrated groups eager to hold lawmakers'
feet to the fire in any way they can. Groups come and go sometimes without leaving any trace
of their presence, save a few lines at a legislative hearing or a vague name imprinted in the
mind of a local lawmaker. Many groups inject complaints and rage into policy debates with
little sense of how to resolve them. Groups (and individuals) run up against recalcitrant public
officials or simply make demands that administrators are unable to meet. Sometimes they in-
sist on policy solutions that have demonstrably little impact but simply make them feel better.
They demand more and more police while simultaneously criticizing police for inadequacy
and corruption. They seem to know little about the policy solutions they want and even less
about how to get them.
Id. at 177.
196. See Wayne A. Logan, The Shadow Criminal Law of Municipal Governance, 62 OHIO ST. L.J.
1409 (2001).
197. See Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30 CRIME &
JUST. 283 (2003).
198. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Respect and the Fourth Amendment, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
15(2003).
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area of criminal justice in the first place. That lack of political power might
indeed be what explains the lack of protective local legislation, not the
absence of a problem. Absent more detailed local empirical data, it may be
hard to tell in any individual case whether silence is thus the result of si-
lencing, or of comfort with the local status quo. Where there is silencing
and where the harms done are severe, of course, local minorities may seek
ways outside the formal legal system to make their pleas heard, as occurred
when riots broke out in Cincinnati several years ago over decades of per-
ceived police racial profiling and physical abuse. 199 Where avoidance of
such violence and the protection of minorities against even subconscious
racial bias in policing are at stake, we should err on the side of protecting
against abuses instead of awaiting empirical data on the extent of minority
political power in every locality in the nation. My critic ultimately agreed
with a softer version of my thesis: namely, that, whatever the degree of
local minority political power over policing, there is good reason to believe
that there will be much less such power at the state level, and that might
make state legislation providing a no-arrest right without a remedy a rele-
vant Fourth Amendment concern. This softer version of my thesis still
makes the point that the Court may have oversimplified the issue it faced in
Moore.
D. The Objection that Minority and Majority Interests Coincide
A different sort of objection takes an opposite tack, arguing that it is
unlikely that state legislation recognizing rights that on paper should pro-
tect minorities (but do not in practice) has anything to do with minority
power or minority concerns in even rare cases.2 00 But this argument
strengthens, rather than weakens, my thesis. If state-level legislation that
may incidentally and theoretically benefit minorities passes only because of
majority concerns about protecting themselves, then if that legislation in
practice in fact does not protect minorities, minorities will lack the political
clout to correct the problem. One major cause of such failures is legislation
that creates a right without a remedy. Where that occurs, courts perform a
helpful constitutional function if they provide the missing remedy, thus
creating an incentive for the legislature to fix the problem. Of course, the
exclusionary rule is not the only conceivable effective remedy. But I think
it unlikely that existing state or federal civil rights or tort actions or police
199. Marie McCain, Grand jury indicts 63 in looting, violence, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER,
http://www.enquirer.com/editions/2001/04/21/loc- grand-jury-indicts.html (Apr. 21, 2001).
200. See Chris Chambers Goodman, Redacting Race in the Quest for Colorblind Justice: How
Racial Privacy Legislation Subverts Antidiscrimination Laws, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 299 (2004).
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disciplinary actions will be effective deterrents. If a state created and im-
plemented a more effective deterrent in its no-arrest legislation, then that
might change the constitutional calculus, though that would ignore the
value of functions of the exclusionary rule beyond deterrence.
A final objection might be that I have addressed a problem unlikely to
arise much in the future. The argument is that majorities have caught on to
the dangers of remedy-less statutes to their own privacy and locomotive
interests and so will not make similar mistakes in this area. For example,
North Carolina legislation permitting use of electronic speed passes at tolls
bars using the electronic devices to pursue speeding or other legal
claims. 201 The devices may only be used to ensure payment of tolls. 202 That
protects everyone by limiting the legislation's scope. I am not sure I see
why, however, majorities will extend such thinking to all motor vehicle
code revisions. Everyone wanting to take certain routes must pay a toll,
white or black, rich or poor. The physical obstacle of the toll both cannot
be avoided. But not everyone violating motor vehicle laws will be arrested.
If majority whites do not expect to be arrested, they have no incentive to
change no-arrest legislation.
More importantly, however, I am not limiting my argument to Moore-
like legislation. Rather, I wanted to create awareness that seemingly neutral
legislation affecting privacy and locomotive rights may plausibly at times
create a danger of race-and-class-based abuse in practice and that Fourth
Amendment doctrine can affect the incentives for states to correct the prob-
lem. I also wanted to begin exploring the idea that the Fourth Amendment's
meaning can sometimes vary geographically. Moore serves simply as an
example to begin that conversation.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, I do not claim that in this brief essay I have even come
close to proving my case. Indeed, I probably have raised as many questions
as the number to which I have suggested answers. But I do suggest that I
have made a plausible case-a case sufficiently plausible to demonstrate
that this one argument is a complex and troubling one overlooked by the
Court and meriting attention. Indeed, I see Moore as but one example
among many in which the Court either ignores issues of race and their links
to class, or mentions but summarily dismisses them in its Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence. It is important at least to take these issues more seri-
201. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-63, 14-3.1.
202. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-63.
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ously.
Ultimately, my goal has simply been to serve as gadfly, to try to
prompt new ways of thinking about the roles of the intersection of politics,
race, class, and geography in interpreting the Fourth Amendment. That
project is barely begun here and I hope will be continued by me and by
others intrigued by the possibilities. If your interest is piqued, even if only
to disagree with me, then my job is done.
